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Abstract
In Susanna Siegel’s compelling presentation of the case for 
the rationality of perception, a “significant part of the con-
structive defense” is played by the idea that there are “infer-
ential routes to perceptual experience” (Siegel 2017, p. 94). 
Inferences, after all, are epistemically evaluable and bear on 
the rational standing of their conclusions. She argues that an 
obstacle to accepting this idea is a “Reckoning Model” of 
inference, and shows by example that we recognize as infer-
ences various familiar kinds of responses to information that 
do not fit this model. She offers a more general approach to 
the nature of inference that fits these examples and accom-
modates inferential routes to perceptual experience. I argue 
that Siegel needs to say more about the mental processes 
involved in such inferrings, and how it can be more than 
merely associative and yet still distinct from Reckoning. 
Fortunately, a psychologically- and conceptually-grounded 
distinction between model-free vs. model-based learning 
and guidance processes can provide a characterization that 
plays the role Siegel needs.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION—THE PROJECT
Inference—when thought of as an actual mental process, inferring,1 in which the mind transitions 
in a directed way from some information-bearing states to others—is of special interest in episte-
mology in part because it has one foot in the psychological realm and one foot in the normative. 
Inferring, along with perceiving, promises to be a process that is incontestably causal, yet nonethe-
less can realize normative properties, e.g., by being more or less aptly responsive to reasons. And 
thanks to this duality of perceiving and inferring, we, too, can qualify as more or less aptly respon-
sive to reasons.
However, it is inferring in particular that has been thought to have an especially close con-
nection to the normative property of rationality. Perceptual experience, some will say, enables 
us to be aptly responsive to reasons, but it is essentially passive—the content of immediate 
experience is, on this view, simply “given”—and so deficits in perceptual acuity, for example, 
my poor vision, are not deficits in rationality. By contrast, how I respond to the fact of my poor 
vision—whether I take steps to check my vision against my other senses or against the testi-
mony of others, whether I take my poor vision into account in claiming authority on perceptual 
matters, etc.—does bear on my rationality. In this case, then, it is not the sensory information 
I simply happen to receive that bears on my rational standing, but what I do with this informa-
tion—how I compare it with other sources, or connect it with other information, or project it 
into the future, or use it to guide the search for more information—that qualifies for rational 
assessment. These doings are exercises of epistemic agency for which I can be held responsible 
or given credit as a more or less rational epistemic agent. And they are, or at least mostly are, 
inferrings. Thanks to inferring, I can play an active role in determining the extent to which my 
beliefs are supported in epistemically appropriate ways by the information I receive, even if that 
information itself is epistemically defective. In a paper extending the account of inference in 
The Rationality of Perception, Susanna Siegel writes:
(i) Inference is a paradigm of person-level reasoning that redounds well or badly on the subject. [p. 1]2
(ii) The hallmark of inference is that the conclusions drawn by inferrers epistemically depend on the 
premises from which they are drawn. [p. 1]3
Inferring comes in many forms, corresponding to different kinds of support relations—inductive 
inference supported by evidential, causal, or statistical relations, practical inference supported by past 
experience and means-ends relations, deductive inference supported by logical or algebraic relations, 
etc., which form the ground upon which epistemic dependence supervenes.
 1Annoying as this will probably prove to be, I will often use the term ‘inferring’ or ‘inferrings’ rather than ‘inference’ or 
‘inferences’ when talking about psychological processes, to try to avoid conflation with the abstract argument forms we also 
call ‘inferences’.
 2Siegel (2019). Unattributed page references in the text refer to this article. In what follows, I will be taking ‘reasoning’ here 
in a generic sense that does not simply entail that reasoning is an inference.
 3I will be identifying four “marks of inference” in Siegel’s (2019) discussion, (i)-(iv), but should stress that these are not 
broken out and numbered as such in Siegel’s text, so I am taking a certain liberty in doing so. Most of what follows will not 
depend upon whether all four are, for her, “marks” or “hallmarks” of inference, whether they embody redundancy, or whether 
she would add others.
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A good account of inferring should help us see why inferring is important for epistemic agents, 
and one plausible answer fits well with Siegel’s approach: inferring is of special value to inferrers 
since it is a way of leveraging the information they already have to reach a new, or more qualified, 
or better-understood information-state, even when they cannot obtain new information. If they 
leverage their existing information by following or being responsive to the kinds of evidential, 
causal, probabilistic, etc., connections upon which epistemic support supervenes, then the new 
or changed information-state has some chance of being an improvement—at least by the individ-
ual’s own lights. So we can think of inferring as a response to one’s information-state, explicitly 
or implicitly intended to reach a conclusion that is supported by that state. Siegel thus advances a 
generic “Response Hypothesis” concerning what is common to all the different forms of inference. 
According to this hypothesis, inferring is: 
(iii)   … a distinctive kind of response to an informational state, or to a combination of such states, 
that produces a conclusion … . [p. 10, emphasis added]
Let’s unpack this a bit. To call the final state in a causally-connected sequence of thoughts 
produced in a mind the “conclusion” of that sequence is to say something more than that it is the 
last member of the sequence. To count as a conclusion, the content of the final member of the 
sequence must somehow, at least from the individual’s standpoint, follow from, or be drawn from, 
or be supported by, or be reached via, etc., the contents of the earlier steps. A conclusion thus 
reflects the way the individual “takes” the contents of the previous members of the sequence to 
bear upon the last member: they are “taken” to epistemically support the final member, and this 
is arguably characteristic of deductive, inductive, abductive, analogical, means-end, etc. infer-
ence. Of course, we do not require that individuals possess such concepts as <epistemic support> 
or <epistemic dependence>, but inferrers will nonetheless be responsive to features that can bear 
(or seem to bear from the standpoint of the individual) the relations that correspond to these 
concepts. For example, if I conclude that q given that I take things to be p, I will understand that 
if p is called into question, this will also to some degree call into question my conclusion that 
things are q. Features (i)-(iii) thus are plausibly thought to be marks of a very wide range of in-
ferential practices.4
The idea that inferring involves not only arriving at a conclusion-state, but producing this 
state in response to one’s antecedent information-state, brings to light the causal as well as the 
epistemic aspect of inferring and their close relationship. In inferring, the individual reaches her 
final thought in part because of the earlier thoughts, where this becausal relation is agential as 
well as epistemic. The inferring must be something she does, and so be a “person-level” activity 
on her part.
Does this “person-level”, agential aspect of the sort of inferring we are here concerned with 
imply that a mental transition will count as an inference just in case the individual is explicitly 
aware of the full contents of the states involved and expressly controls each step along the way? 
That would hardly be plausible—inferential processes are often very complex, and, as any student 
of logic knows, to spell out all the assumptions and premises even of perfectly ordinary inferences 
would be a very demanding task. Consider this example of an everyday inference, provided by Paul 
Boghossian: 
 4Even in means-end reasoning, the contribution a means is thought to make toward attaining one’s end is reason to believe—
epistemic support for—taking the means to be justified.
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On waking up one morning I recall that:
(1) It rained last night.
I combine this with my knowledge that
(2) If it rained last night, then the streets are wet.
to conclude:
(3) The streets are wet.
This belief then affects my choice of footwear. [Boghossian 2014, p. 2]
Boghossian’s knowledge is no doubt richer than (2) suggests—for example, he only has certain streets in 
mind, and if he were in an arid part of the world, or if the night’s rain had been brief, or if the weather were 
sunny and streets were gravel, etc., he would not expect the streets still to be wet. It is because of this richer 
background, and his assumptions about these factors, most of which are no doubt implicit, that he is willing 
to rely upon (2) in concluding (3) from (1) and making a decision about footwear. Recall that inferring is a 
mental action not a logical schema, so we need to explain how he “took” his information-state such that (3) 
was a conclusion he’d reach in the circumstances, and (1) and (2) give us only a glimpse of this—most of the 
complex causal knowledge in play remains implicit. Indeed, even the conclusions of typical “person-level” 
inferrings can be implicit, as when one realizes, while talking with someone in a conditional mode about 
future planning, that one has already reached a conclusion about what one will do, without having explicitly 
noticed how or when.
However, as Siegel notes, we must be careful to distinguish implicit elements in person-level in-
ferrings from entirely sub-personal processes, lest we run afoul of mark (i). Vision scientists, for ex-
ample, often use the word ‘inference’ to characterize computations that take place early in the stream 
of visual processing, e.g., the “inference” from a certain pattern of firing of discrete retinal cells to 
the positing of a continuous boundary between objects in the visual field. Siegel agrees that this use 
of ‘inference’ is legitimate, insisting only that individuals are not rationally accountable for purely 
sub-personal inferrings:
Some phenomena aptly labelled ‘inference’ don’t redound on the subject’s rational standing 
at all. For instance, inferences in which the premise-states are states of early vision with no 
epistemic power to justify beliefs fall into this category. Here I set those phenomena aside. 
[p. 2]
An important distinction between implicit person-level inferrings and sub-personal inferences is 
that person-level inferrings, as actions, have an intentional character, giving them success conditions, 
that is, conditions for what will count as performing that particular action well or completely. Given the 
epistemic purport of inferrings, their success conditions include an epistemic component. Thus Siegel 
writes: 
(iv)     Inferences can be epistemically better or worse, depending on the epistemic status of the premises 
and the relationship between the premises and the conclusions. [p. 1]
2 |  FROM IDLING TO RECKONING
We can perhaps get a clearer picture of the combined force of (i)-(iv) by considering a form of person-
level mental transition that does not bear these marks, mental idling:
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Idling: Thoughts are occurring in an individual’s mind one after another in a causal 
sequence, such that each thought plays a causal role in the genesis of the next, but the 
individual herself is not imparting any direction to the sequence. As far as the agent is 
concerned, the sequence of thought simply happens.
Mental idling is a form of mental activity, which might be more or less implicit, but it has no success 
conditions and issues in no conclusion, though it might at any moment cease. If we were to happen upon 
someone just emerging from a bout of Idling, and ask him, “So, then, what do you conclude?”, he would 
likely reply, “I didn’t conclude anything at all. I wasn’t trying to figure anything out.” This bout of mental 
idling therefore would not itself be successful or unsuccessful, though one could be successful or unsuc-
cessful at entering or leaving the state of mental Idling. For example, if by chance the last thought in the 
idling sequence was a non-obvious logical consequence of the contents of the thoughts that had gone be-
fore, since there was no guiding inferential intention, the relation of epistemic support between the con-
tents of earlier and later thoughts would be happenstance from the standpoint of the individual—not 
something he could claim rational for, or would be likely to. Perhaps he’d be just as surprised as we are. 
“Fancy that! I had no idea.” Mental Idling, then, does not bear marks (i)-(iv)—it is not bad inferring, but 
non-inferring.5
An orthodox theory of inferring does not, however, stop at identifying certain “marks” of infer-
ence, such as (i)-(iv). Rather, it seeks to give an account of the nature of inferring in terms of necessary 
and sufficient “structure and components” (p. 2) that will explain why inferring, but not, for example, 
mental idling, bears such marks as epistemic evaluability and rational accountability. The orthodox 
theory of inferring upon which Siegel focuses has at its base what she characterizes as the Reckoning 
Model:
Reckoning Model (RM): When you infer q from p, you have in mind premise states 
with p (or its conjuncts) as its content. You also have in mind a reckoning state with the 
content: p supports q. You draw the conclusion that q because you have in mind both the 
premise states and the reckoning state. [adapted from Siegel 2019, introduction]
The Reckoning Model is the target of Siegel’s criticisms, but not because she is proposing an alterna-
tive account of the “structures and components” essential for a mental process to be an inferring. Indeed, 
her project is one of “illumination without analysis”:
… the nature of inference may be illuminated even without positing any structure beyond 
what’s posited by the hypothesis that inferring is a distinctive kind of response to an in-
formational state, or to a combination of such states, that produces a conclusion. [p. 10]
She calls this “the response hypothesis”, and notes that, while “[t]he reckoning model entails the re-
sponse hypothesis, the response hypothesis does not entail the reckoning model” (p. 10).6
So, rather than building up from more elementary mental mechanisms to acts of mind that could 
bear marks (i)-(iv), Siegel proposes to start with marks (i)-(iv), and canvas a wide array of mental 
 5Siegel uses the term ‘jogging’, drawn from John Broome (2014), for something like this. But actual jogging is an action that 
might be well or badly done. Even if the brain “idles well”, the way a car’s engine can “idle well” when it doesn’t run too fast 
or stall out, this is not an action on the part of the agent.
 6Indeed, a recent survey of attempts to provide such an analysis concludes that we must either give up the idea of ourselves as 
rational epistemic agents or accept something like rule-following as an unanalyzed primitive (Boghossian 2014).
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processes to which we normally do—or do not—apply the kinds of epistemic evaluation and rational 
responsibility reflected in (i)-(iv).7 Once we’ve embarked on this project, she argues, we’ll quickly see 
that inference is a much broader phenomenon than proponents of the Reckoning Model and other 
traditional models recognize. By canvassing this diversity guided by marks (i)-(iv), we can open the 
way for a more adequate understanding of inferring in its various guises. The result in Siegel’s hands 
is indeed illuminating: truer to actual inferential practice and a welcome fresh start in an area of phil-
osophical inquiry where attempts to give outright analyses so often lead to circularity or dead ends.
3 |  THE CANONICAL RECKONING MODEL 
OF INFERENCE
According to the Reckoning Model (RM), an inferring differs from (for example) a bout of mental 
idling in two primary ways: (1) in inferring, the inferrer “takes” her antecedent thoughts to support her 
consequent thoughts, where this involves representing to herself the (supposed) support relationship 
via a “reckoning-state”;8 (2) the inferrer reaches the consequent thought she does at least in part be-
cause of this reckoning-state: it plays a causal role, along with the antecedent thoughts (premise-
states), in generating the consequent thought (conclusion-state), where this role depends upon that 
“taking”. The reckoning-state thus figures in the agent’s rationale in reaching the conclusion she does, 
and inferrings can be more or less well done depending upon the epistemic quality of this rationale.
Must the agent be aware of this rationale in order to infer? As noted above, requiring explicit 
awareness would be excessively restrictive. So a weaker self-awareness condition is called for, which 
Siegel (2019, p. 2) formulates, following Boghossian (2014), as:
Self-Awareness Condition (SAC): “[Inference is] mental action that a person performs, 
in which he is either aware, or can become aware, of why he is moving from some beliefs 
to others.”
In any given instance of inferring, the contents of the reckoning-state, or of the premise-states, or of 
the conclusion-state, or of any combination of these, might be implicit. But (SAC) places a limit on this—
the rationale of the inferring, the “why”, must, at least under conditions favorable to reflection, be such 
that the agent could be aware of it. Combining (SAC) with (RM) yields what Siegel calls the “Canonical 
Reckoning Model”, which she takes to be the best-motivated and most stable form of that model, and can 
be formulated as:
Canonical Reckoning Model (CRM):
The reckoning state (see RM) is in principle accessible by reflection (the inferrer “can 
become aware of why he is moving from some beliefs to others”).
 7Here as elsewhere it is important to remind ourselves that a theory of inferring, as a psychological process or action, is not a 
theory of inference as a logical operation.
 8I will hyphenate ‘reckoning-state’ in order to make clear that it is a term of art. Lots of different kinds of mental states might 
deserve to be called “reckoning states” in the ordinary sense. Similarly for ‘premise-state’, ‘conclusion-state’, etc. And we 
will capitalize ‘Reckoning’ when used to refer to the model or its advocates, to distinguish this special use from ordinary uses 
of the term.
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The becausal condition is not merely causal, but includes the inferrer's first-person 
rationalization of why the conclusion is drawn.
Siegel’s dispute is not with the idea that thought processes satisfying the Canonical Reckoning Model 
constitute inferences—perhaps even be the “pinnacle of intelligent response” to one’s informational- 
situation (2019, p. 17). She disputes instead whether the Canonical Reckoning Model, even with the 
weaker Self-Awareness Condition, formulates anything like a necessary condition for a succession of 
thoughts to constitute an inferring.
4 |  A DILEMMA?
Siegel uses a series of well-crafted examples to persuade us that the Canonical Reckoning Model is 
too restrictive: there exist, she argues, many familiar thought processes that do not satisfy the condi-
tions of the Canonical Reckoning Model and yet constitute responses to one’s informational-situation 
that bear the marks (i)-(iv) and deserve to be called inferrings. The Response Hypothesis acknowl-
edges this, hence the slogan, “inference without reckoning”.9
Siegel is aware, however, that her appeal to examples, even if intuitively plausible, faces a funda-
mental objection from Canonical Reckoners:
Perhaps the most principled challenge to the Response [H]ypothesis is a dilemma. Either 
in inference one appreciates or registers the rational relationship between inferential in-
puts and conclusions (or purports to do so) in the form of a reckoning state, or else one’s 
mind is merely caused to move from one state to another. If there is no such reckoning 
state, then the information state can make a causal impact on the thinker, but cannot make 
a rational impact. [p. 16]
Siegel wants to argue that this dilemma is a false one:
The picture of inference without reckoning allows a third option. It is possible to respond 
rationally to an information state without a reckoning state that represents what makes 
that response rational. [p. 16]
How is this possible? If:
One’s acknowledgment of rational support consists in the response, rather than taking the 
form of a state that represents the support relation. [p. 17-18; emphasis added]
I agree that this is possible. However, I suspect that defending the possibility of “inference without 
reckoning” may require more by way of characterizing the processes involved than (i)-(iv) afford. In par-
ticular, we will need to be able to see how, at least in principle, a response innocent of any higher-order 
representation of the support relation between the antecedent and consequent thoughts—what we will call 
a first-order mental transition from one information-state to another—could itself embody an “acknowl-
edgment of rational support”. This will, I claim, require advocates of the Response Hypothesis to venture 
 9It might be more accurate to say “inference without a reckoning-state”—we’ll see why this matters, below.
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more deeply into questions about mental “structure and components” than Siegel proposes to do here, but 
in a way that I think will help ground her overall project.
We can see this most clearly, I think, if we press on the question of how to distinguish Siegel’s 
“inference without reckoning” from nearby non-inferential non-reckoning responses to one’s informa-
tion-state. Consider what might be Siegel’s simplest example.
5 |  PUDDLE
Puddle, Siegel tells us, is an example of “inference without reckoning” that is simple enough to “not 
involve any more cognitive sophistication than what’s needed to … keep one’s feet dry” (p. 5):
Puddle: … while walking along a rainy street, Sin-yee might come to a puddle and think 
that it is too big to hop across, so she will have to go around it. She need not think to 
herself that she has to walk around the puddle if she wants to keep her feet dry. [p. 5; 
emphasis added]10
In Puddle, the italicized phrase would constitute the relevant “reckoning-state”—a state whose con-
tent represents the support relation between Sin-yee’s ends (getting home and keeping her feet dry) and 
the means she takes (walking around this particular puddle). Siegel is claiming, in effect, that Sin-yee’s 
grasp of her situation can be such that it makes walking around the puddle reflect an intelligible, rational 
response on her part, an inference, even though Sin-yee never formulates—implicitly or explicitly—a 
reckoning-state.
However, consider the classical Behaviorist, who will dispute the idea that Sin-yee’s behavior is to 
be explained inferentially. He elaborates: “Sin-yee has encountered puddles in the past and hopped. 
Because she likes having dry feet, she was negatively reinforced for jumping when the puddles were 
too large to clear—i.e., three or more feet in width, as it happened. It took her a while, but she learned 
from foot-soaking hops to be averse to jumping whenever she encounters a puddle wider than three 
feet. This does not require her to mentally imagine some remoter goal ‘in light of which’ trying to 
jump a puddle of this size is a poor idea—the aversion to jumping is conditioned directly to the stim-
ulus condition of encountering a puddle of this size. Moreover, on those occasions in which, faced 
with a puddle wider than three feet, she instead walked around, Sin-yee was rewarded by being able to 
continue on her way home with dry feet, only slightly ‘punished’ by the extra steps and the lost fun of 
hopping. As with the aversion to jumping, this conditioned motivation to walk around is conditioned 
directly to the stimulus situation, without need for any thinking about the future. So now Sin-yee has 
acquired a well-calibrated stimulus-response disposition. She is happier, and her parents are happier. 
All this suffices to establish in Sin-yee the behavior of walking around puddles larger than three feet.”
On this interpretation, Sin-yee would clearly have enough “cognitive sophistication” to keep her 
feet dry, but would we say that she manages this by an inference, or simply by conditioned associa-
tion? 11 After all, the point of the Behaviorist revolution was to purge psychology of the supposedly 
“pernicious mentalism” that led to positing unobservable “internal actions” such as inferences 
 10For expository convenience, I have substituted a proper name, ‘Sin-yee’, for ‘you’ in Siegel’s original framing of the 
example. And to keep with the idea that a high level of cognitive sophistication is not being demanded, let us imagine that 
Sin-yee is a kindergartener walking home from school.
 11Siegel herself contrasts purely associative transitions in thought with inferences, though the examples she considers 
constitute a subset of potential associative responses to one’s information-state (Siegel 2017, section 5.2.).
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performed on private mental representations of non-existent future states. A scientific psychology, the 
Behaviorists argued, must stick to quantifiable observables and the Law of Effect, explaining Sin-
yee’s behavior in terms of a history of reinforcement that yields well-calibrated stimulus-response 
dispositions that operate more like direct associative connections than mental inferences. Behaviorists 
were ambitious—they would seek to give a similar kind of explanation even of the more complex 
behavior in Siegel’s other examples, eschewing any “internal actions” like inferring. Contemporary 
psychologists call this kind of reinforcement learning and behavioral control model-free, since it de-
pends only upon acquired “cached values” (e.g., aversion or attraction) for responses in situations, 
with no reference to past experience, possible future outcomes, or general knowledge such as causal 
models of situations and actions. While contemporary psychologists have largely abandoned the full 
ambitions of classical Behaviorism, they recognize a place in animal and human behavior for such 
model-free learning and control processes.
Siegel concludes with a brief discussion of emotional and aesthetic responses which she sees as 
being “analogous” to “inference without reckoning” in that one can be ignorant of the features of sit-
uations or objects to which one is responding (and thus have no available “reckoning-state” to guide 
the response) while still making a response that is sensitive to relations of epistemic dependence and 
that renders oneself epistemically evaluable.
These kinds of emotional and aesthetic responses are arguably intelligent yet partly 
self-ignorant responses. In this respect, they are directly analogous to self-ignorant in-
ference without reckoning. … [I]nference without reckoning allows that inference can 
tolerate the kinds of self-ignorance described here. Whatever epistemic improvements 
might result from being able to pinpoint what one is responding to and why, in aesthetic, 
emotional, or rational domains, the initial responses one makes prior to any such attempt 
can still reflect the intelligence of the responder. [p. 18]
However, the ability to discern levels of intelligence in responders is not enough to make a case that 
inferring, understood as an exercise of potentially rational epistemic agency, is taking place. Model-
free, associative responses still count as learning, and animals and humans can be better or worse at 
this kind of learning, e.g., in their sensitivity to, facility in acquiring, reliability in acting on, or pro-
portioning of effort to, the reward-contingencies of given acts in given situations. Such responses are 
not “merely causal”, in the way that the succession of thoughts in mental idling was hypothesized to 
be merely causal. We know from recent work in machine learning just how powerful model-free rein-
forcement learning can be—given enough data and processing power, it can yield highly sophisticated 
and successful behaviors in complex situations (Mnih et al., 2015). And animals, humans included, 
have a continuous stream of rich data about their internal states and the world around them, and a 
large number of neurons and synapses, so sophisticated and successful behaviors in complex situations 
would not be beyond their reach, either. Moreover, behaviors guided by model-free learning and con-
trol can be said to be successful in part because such systems track epistemically-relevant phenomena, 
e.g., learning to discriminate signal from noise, to identify the most informative cues in a given con-
text, to calibrate responses to relative frequencies and magnitudes, etc. These discriminative abilities 
non-accidentally operate in ways that pattern on evidential relations, enabling model-free learners to 
solve a wide array of problems, and general problem-solving ability is one common way of thinking 
about intelligence.
The fact that model-free reinforcement learning can yield behavior that is responsive to evidential-
ly-relevant features shows that the original dilemma presented on behalf of the Canonical Reckoner, 
above, is a false one, as Siegel argues. Model-free reinforcement learning represents a third option 
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distinct from self-conscious reckoning, on the one hand, and from “merely causal”, non-intelligent 
responses to information, on the other.
However, the Canonical Reckoner can reply that this could weaken rather than strengthen Siegel’s 
case, since it suggests that examples like Puddle can’t be used to “illuminate without analysis” the 
phenomenon of “inference without reckoning” on the ground that Sin-yee shows intelligent, adaptive 
behavior “without reckoning”, since, if the Behaviorist were right, the behavior might well be “without 
inference” as well. It would seem that we need to inquire more fully into the underlying “structure and 
components” of individuals’ responses to the situations in order to say whether these are, in fact, cases of 
“inference without reckoning” rather than the upshot of well-calibrated stimulus-response dispositions.
This strikes me as a legitimate rejoinder to Siegel—if we are inclined to see cases like Sin-yee’s as 
inferences, the Reckoner will say, that is probably because we are already assuming a good deal about 
the inferential character of the underlying “structure and components”. Indeed, Siegel’s descriptions 
of her two most extended examples contain mentalistic idioms that already assume that inference, or 
something close to it, is going on. In Kindness she speaks of “what leads you to [the] thought” or 
enables you to “reach the judgment” that the clerk is kind (p. 4). And in Pepperoni she speaks not 
only of responding to features, but of how “the conclusion of your inference would weaken” if those 
features were to change (p. 4).
Is there a way to proceed here that could clearly distinguish “inference without reckoning” from 
well-calibrated stimulus-response dispositions, while at the same time not presupposing that implicit 
higher-order representational states are at work underneath? This way of posing the question suggests 
a path forward: we might try to establish the possibility of first-order processes at work underneath, 
effectuating the connections needed to render implicit mental transitions of the kinds that figure in 
Siegel’s examples genuinely dependent upon epistemic support relations. If so, we might be able to 
make good on Siegel’s idea that, in “inference without reckoning”:
One’s acknowledgment of rational support consists in the response, rather than taking the 
form of a state that represents the support relation. [p. 18, emphasis added]
Of course, what would be involved is implicit acknowledgment, since we are looking for a form of 
inference in which explicit representations of rational support relations do not play a role. But for such 
acknowledgment to exist, it would seem that at least two conditions must be met: (a) we must be able to 
see how a first-order response could manifest or embody normatively-appropriate sensitivity to relations 
of epistemic support, even in the absence of higher-order representation of those normative support rela-
tions as such, however implicit; and (b) this first-order response would have to be more than “automatic” 
sub-personal calculation or mere association, and involve person-level activity of a kind that opens up 
the possibility of evaluating the process and the individual as more or less responsive to reasons. Finding 
bona fide mental processes that meet these two conditions would add a fourth category to the original 
(supposed) dilemma: between Canonical Reckoning and mental idling, there would be, in addition to 
well-calibrated stimulus-response dispositions, another form or forms of response that would, thanks to 
meeting (a) and (b), pass a certain threshold of eligibility for the label “inference without reckoning”.
One way to make headway on finding or characterizing mental processes meeting conditions (a) 
and (b) is to look for instances where there isn’t much temptation to posit implicit higher-order pre-
sentations of epistemic support relations, where first-order thought holds sway. A plausible candidate 
would be the psychology of those innocent of normative epistemic concepts, such as very young 
infants or non-human animals. So let’s ask: Why have practicing psychologists largely abandoned 
classical Behaviorism—whether about the behavior of the Sin-yees of the world, or of very young 
infants, or of the intelligent animals in their laboratories?
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6 |  TU QUOQUE :  STATES, PROCESSES, AND SKILLS
But before we do that, it might be worth pausing to ask what is at stake in the question whether we can 
find first-order, person-level mental processes in which support relations play the kind of becausal 
role required if these processes are to count as inferrings in an epistemically-evaluable sense. This 
might seem to be a narrow question, arising as a problem specifically for Siegel’s project of vindicat-
ing “inference without reckoning”. Instead it is, I believe, an instance of a very general problem of 
explaining how inference is possible at all.
To see why, and why this problem arises equally for the defender of the Canonical Reckoning 
Model, let’s say that I am in an information-state I comprising antecedent-states with the content p, 
which as a matter of fact would epistemically support moving to an information-state J which includes 
as well the content q.12 And suppose that I indeed make this mental transition from I to J, where the 
fact that I am in state I partially causes and explains the fact that I come to be in state J. With the be-
causal relation thus thinly described, however, this transition might be no more than mental idling, 
and so not inferential. Suppose, however, we add the constraint that the move to J must also depend in 
some way upon the information content of I and J. Still, this constraint on the becausal relation could 
be met by a purely associational transition from I to J, and, as Siegel points out, purely associational 
transitions are not inferential in the sense that interests us here.
The Canonical Reckoning Model comes in at this point to say that, in order to have the right be-
causal relation, we must add to my antecedent information-state a potentially self-aware reckon-
ing-state R with the content p supports q, and this state and its content, must play a role in the transition 
to J. However, adding another state might not be to the point, since this would still be compatible with 
the move from the antecedent information-state I + R to the subsequent information-state J + R being 
merely associational—sensitive to information-content, but non-inferential. One solution that will not 
work would be for the Canonical Reckoner to answer by saying that the move from I + R to J + R 
becomes inferential because it involves a becausal role for a potentially self-aware recognition of the 
epistemic support relation between I + R and J + R. For then we would need to add a reckoning-state 
S with the content (p & (p supports q)) supports q, playing a becausal role. And down this path lies 
regress.13
Now, the Canonical Reckoner will surely object. He might say: “That’s the wrong way to think 
about it. Don’t think of the role of a reckoning-state in inference as that of an additional premise- 
state—we all know where that leads. Think instead of the reckoning-state as playing a shaping role 
in the movement of mind, guiding the transition from the antecedent information-state to the conse-
quent information-state, without entering as an additional step in the inference. That kind of guided 
response is what it is to be sensitive to the reason-making consideration provided by the reckon-
ing-state’s content.”
That’s a reasonable response on his part. But why isn’t it a response Siegel can make with respect to 
the original movement of mind from I to J? That is, why couldn’t Siegel say that what it is to be sensi-
tive to the support relations between the contents of I and J is for the evidential, causal, probabilistic, 
means-end, etc. relations contained in I to shape and guide the mental transition from I to J? If the 
Canonical Reckoner is willing to entertain the idea that a mental transition—in this case, from I + R to 
 12For ease of exposition, we will be using as examples only cases where the content of the antecedent information-state 
actually supports the content of the consequent information-state.
 13Siegel herself does not wish to rest her case for “inference without reckoning” on regress problems (Siegel 2017, p. 94; 
Siegel 2019, p. 9), but it’s worth noticing that the problem of regress arises for the Canonical Reckoning Model as well in 
order that Siegel not bear an unfair burden of proof.
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J + R—can be an inferring if it manifests a sensitivity to the support relations contained in the contents 
of I + R, without a higher-order reckoning-state to stand behind and guide this transition, then the 
same should be true for the information about relations that sustain epistemic relevance in the contents 
of I in relation to J. Recall Boghossian’s inference about the streets. What guides the transition from 
(1) “It rained last night” to (3) “The streets are wet” is not a higher-order reckoning state mentioning 
epistemic support relations, but a causal generalization, (2) “If it rained last night, then the streets are 
wet”, that would, if true, make it the case that an epistemic support relation obtains between (1) and 
(3). If the worry of the Canonical Reckoner is that the inferrer might not understand why he is making 
the mental transition he does, then that worry would seem to be met by (1)-(3). Indeed, one might 
think that (2) does a better job of explaining why, or manifesting the inferrer’s take on the situation, 
or understanding of it, than would a reckoning-state. Typically, the antecedent information-state I in 
a given ordinary inference will contain a large number of relations—predictive, causal, means-end, 
etc.—upon which epistemic support relations supervene, and so be capable of providing the inferrer an 
appropriate rationale for drawing the conclusion he does in the circumstances. No commentary on the 
existence of epistemic support relations need be added—though, of course, making the inference at-
tests to an implicit competence in, for example, using causal relations predictively (or retrodictively, or 
hypothetically, etc.) to guide thought and action, such as making a rational choice of shoes for the day.
To make a start in answering, a distinction is needed. We are sometimes tempted to think of infer-
ences in terms of inputs and outputs—an antecedent information-state containing the premise-content 
goes in, and a consequent information-state containing the conclusion-content comes out. This makes 
it look as if the response to the antecedent information-state in which we are interested, and which 
we will be assessing for intelligence or rationality, is the consequent information-state. For example, 
when Siegel talks of “epistemic dependence”, it seems in some places that she has in mind epistemic 
dependence of the conclusion-content upon the premise-content. She offers, as
… the main diagnostic of inference: epistemic dependence. You could have better or 
worse reasons for the conclusion … , and that would make the conclusion better or worse. 
[p. 4]
But it might be more in the spirit of her approach to say that “you could have better or worse reasons 
for your concluding, and that would make your concluding better or worse”. That is, the response she 
ultimately is interested in is not the content of the conclusion independent of the process that generated it, 
but the whole consisting of the process and content. For example, after mentioning a number of non-infer-
ential mental transitions—mental jogging, rhyming, association, etc.—she writes,
On the face of it, what’s lacking from these cases is a distinctive way of responding to 
the [antecedent]-state that produces the [consequent]-state. These transitions fail to be 
inferences, because they lack this kind of response. [p. 15; emphasis added]
Rhyming or association could deliver a consequent-state with a content that is in fact a legitimate 
conclusion from the content of the antecedent-state, but this would not constitute inferring, on her view. 
And the conclusion-producing processes she’s interested in are of a particular kind—they must be actions 
on the part of the individual responding that make epistemic evaluation of her and her thinking fitting. So 
that, if we are to make good on Siegel’s claim that, in “inference without reckoning”,
One’s acknowledgment of rational support consists in the response, rather than taking the 
form of a state that represents the support relation. [p. 18, emphasis added]
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we need to be able to say what it would be for a mental action to be a process of a kind that constitutes 
an appropriate acknowledgment of support without needing to say this of itself. While that would be mys-
terious if we focused only on the content of the consequent-state, as if a consequence-state with content 
q that was produced by association would in itself be different from a consequence-state with the same 
content produced by inference. However, once we think of the individual’s response as incorporating the 
process producing that content, the picture becomes clearer. To ask what it might look like for a process 
of thought transition to constitute “acknowledgement” of the relevant support relations, we will begin by 
considering how many psychologists distinguish inferential from associative thought processes.
7 |  A PROTO-INFERENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Within psychology, a pivotal factor in the rejection of classical Behaviorism as a research program 
was that even laboratory rats, to say nothing of humans, turned out to comport themselves in ways that 
did not fit the Behaviorist’s associationist account.
Rats showed themselves capable of learning spontaneously by exploration without external rein-
forcement—relations were learned, and used to pursue goals effectively in novel situations, without 
conditioning. For example, rats allowed to explore a maze without reinforcement, and then trained 
by reinforcement to take a particular path through the maze, were able, when they encountered a 
newly-introduced barrier along their trained path, to spontaneously improvise an alternative path that 
took them efficiently to the location where they had previously found food (Schmidt & Redish 2013). 
Doing so required that they integrate information learned in separate contexts (e.g., free exploration 
and training) and be able to project this information into novel contexts and synthesize novel actions 
that effectively meet their goals. They were leveraging the information they acquired, not just accu-
mulating it. The pioneering critic of classical Behaviorism, Edward Tolman, identified such learning 
and behavior control as “purposive” or “molar”, to draw attention both to the fact that it is organized 
around goals and not merely <situation-response> pairs and the fact that it occurs at the level of the 
whole animal—drawing widely upon the rat’s varied sources of information and capacities to act, 
in contrast to “local”, behaviorally-stereotyped stimulus-response dispositions. In another example, 
rats trained in a maze, when they encountered the maze flooded with water, promptly swam to the 
food tray, a complex behavior that had never been previously deployed or conditioned (Tolman 1948). 
Using behavioral observation, Tolman hypothesized that rats form “cognitive maps” that integrate the 
results of spatial exploration and reward history into an intelligent guidance system that gives them 
considerable “autonomy” in relation to whatever particular training regimes they have undergone, 
and permitting them to “infer” relative location independent of the particular paths run (1948). Since 
Tolman, psychologists working at the neural level have assembled an impressive body of evidence that 
the expression “cognitive map” is not an anthropocentric projection. Patterns of neural activation in the 
hippocampus and entorhinal cortex as the rat explores a space register two kinds of spatial information, 
relational and grid-like. Systematic activation of these neural patterns takes place not only when the 
rat is moving in the maze, but when it is resting or sleeping, where repeated, stimulus-independent 
activations correspond to simulated trajectories in these “maps”, including “short-cut” trajectories the 
rats have never previously traveled. Moreover, when rats are at choice points in the maze, activation 
in these “maps” spreads forward, ahead of the rats’ actual location, sweeping the two branching paths 
and connecting this information with previous learning about reward magnitudes and frequencies— 
indeed, neural firing rates are found to correspond to the “expected value” of the available paths in light 
of the rat’s previous experience. Once this expected value information is computed, it projects into 
motor-control circuits where comparison occurs and the rat chooses a path accordingly (Johnson et al. 
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2007). Moreover, “maps” are not merely passive in real-time behavioral guidance—the outcome of a 
given choice is continuously compared with prior expectation, and discrepancies function to update the 
rat’s “cognitive map” and adjust out-going motor commands (Redish 2016).
Such “map-like” learning, choice, and motor control is called model-based, in contrast to 
the model-free associative learning discussed above. Behavioral and neural evidence suggests 
that model-based learning and control in rats includes not only spatial relations and the dis-
tribution, magnitude, and frequency of rewards, but also degrees of uncertainty, causal con-
nections, and social relations. Such a model-based architecture makes possible both forward, 
expectation-based guidance of choice and behavior and inverse, discrepancy-based guidance of 
updating. While rats themselves, as far as we know, do not have concepts like <utility>, <prob-
ability>, <epistemic support>, etc., their behavioral choice and motor control can be mathe-
matically modeled to a good approximation by Bayesian inference and rational choice theory 
(Körding & Wolpert 2006).
Model-based architecture makes good sense for foraging animals, but especially for those who 
have complex needs and social relations and are likely to inhabit an environment that does not sim-
ply afford stable “reward contingencies” for behaviors, and who face strong metabolic limitations 
on computation. It is no fluke of evolution that highly-intelligent animals have this kind of mental 
architecture. Contemporary control theory suggests that, if we think of the brain as the “regulator” 
of the organism’s interactions with the environment in light of its goals, then achieving robust ef-
fectiveness and efficiency in this regulatory task requires the building of models (Conant & Ashby 
1970). Whether or not we philosophers are happy to call the ways in which rats construct and utilize 
multi-dimensional mental models inferential, it seems to me less controversial that model-based regu-
lation of cognition and behavior affords an example of how an information-state could encode spatial, 
causal, probabilistic, means-end, etc. relations in such a way that they can literally guide the animal’s 
responses in learning and behavior.
Model-based learning and control thus provide an entry-point for assessment not only in terms 
of intelligent behavior, but in terms such as accuracy of spatial, causal, and predictive representa-
tions, and effectiveness and efficiency in representing and evaluating alternatives in order to make a 
choice in terms of expected value rather than acquired habit. This is evidenced in the psychologists’ 
ability to ask and answer serious questions about how well the patterns of neural firings of rats 
(or other intelligent animals) approximate normative models of learning or decision-making, and 
how this could explain flexible, intelligent behavior in circumstances where associative accounts 
cannot. To be sure, the claim is not that rats represent such normative features as evidential or 
rational support as such, which would require normative concepts, but that they construct mental 
models that encode the relations upon which evidential and rational support relations supervene. 
This makes it the case that rat mental and behavioral responses are, for example, attributable at the 
whole-animal level to responsiveness to considerations of kinds we can identify as evidentially- 
relevant or reason-giving.
Such model-based architectures are helpful in thinking about how inference is possible without 
regress. Recall that what we needed, whether we are Siegelians or Canonical Reckoners, is a cred-
ible account of what it would be for an information-state that encodes the grounds of epistemic 
support relations to operate to guide or shape mental transitions in ways that are appropriately re-
sponsive to support relations without introducing a “premise” or “rule”—or “reckoning-state”—
that would require a further inferential step. Mental models are constituted by networks of 
weighted, directed connections, and information travels the paths made by these connections in 
proportion to these weights. In a simple example, the weights and directions of connections in the 
model arise in response to frequencies and sequences of perceptual elements in past experience, 
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and new sensory inputs can enter such a network to yield a particular pattern of activation pattern 
that terminates in a perceptual identification (or a degree of confidence in a particular perceptual 
identification) of a persisting object. A “premise” or “rule” connecting these input features with 
the identification of an object of that kind does not play a role, so we need not add an inference 
to the process that, if we were psychologists, we might call “perceptual inference”. Further, this 
object identification can then enter a model of causal relations to yield expectations about the ob-
ject’s subsequent behavior, which in turn can guide the individual’s subsequent motor control and 
learning from discrepancy. All of this is a continuous flow of information in which the antecedent 
information-state of the rat, prior to the original sensory input, provided a model-based structure 
that shaped and guided the rats’ responses throughout in line with how the rat “understands” rel-
evant spatial, causal, predictive, reward, and control relations—how she “took” her situation to 
be and what she “took into account” in acting as she did. Even if no higher-order reckoning-state 
representing the epistemic support relations on view here was involved, we still can provide an 
answer to such questions as “Why did the rat make the choice it did?”, “What did she see in taking 
the right-hand path?”, “What is guiding her on-going behavior?”, etc. So, the rat’s response as a 
whole is not a mere relation of input to output, but a complex “take” on her situation and its pros-
pects grounded in a large “knowledge structure” and set of competencies, and once we understand 
this take, we can see why it acts as it does.
Call such structured, information-sensitive, projective, thought- and action-guiding responses 
proto-inferential. Proto-inference gives us an idea of how a first-order mental process could, even in 
the absence of higher-order representations of support relations, nonetheless constitute a response to 
new information that non-accidentally embodies apt sensitivity to relations of evidential or means-
end relevance “in light of” the individual’s antecedent information-state, fulfilling desideratum (a), 
above. Moreover, this response is not activity in a special-purpose, “automatic” sub-agential calcu-
lation or a “mere” well-calibrated disposition, but an “organism-level” activity of the rat “in light 
of” its overall “take” on the situation as bearing upon its goals, fulfilling desideratum (b). The rat 
has thus become evaluable in such epistemic terms as intelligence, accuracy, sensitivity to relevant 
evidence, proportionality of expectation to evidence, and so on. This does not make the rat’s mind 
the mind of a rational individual, since rational individuals can do more by way of representing, 
evaluating, and guiding the work of their own minds than is made possible by the first-order sensi-
tivity to reason-making features embodied in a rat’s mental models. But it does show how an infor-
mation-state I with a content p that epistemically supports a transition to an information-state J with 
content q could, in itself, guide the individual’s thought to q by those considerations contained in I 
that constitute the grounds of the epistemic support relation to J, and in the ways they are relevant 
to the content of J.
We now face the next step in understanding “inference without reckoning”, which requires us to 
see how this kind of proto-inferential structure could be embedded within a psychology capable of 
forming and using self-representations in ways that could constitute “inferences without reckoning” 
that qualify for, and qualify the individual for, evaluation as more or less rational. Richard Feynman’s 
autobiography recounts his days as a youth repairing radios (1985, p. 20). Once, when confronted 
with a puzzling form of noise, he did not open the radio but paced back and forth asking himself what 
might cause such a noise. It came to him that such a noise could result from tubes heating up in the 
wrong order, then he promptly opened the radio, reversed the tubes, and solved the problem. This 
made his reputation, as the owner of the radio reported to everyone, “He fixes radios by thinking!” 
How would an inherited proto-inferential system help Sin-yee keep her feet and shoes dry inferen-
tially, that is, by thinking?
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8 |  PUDDLE REVISITED
So let’s return to Puddle. How would a model-based account of Sin-yee differ from the model-free 
account provided by the classical Behaviorist, and what might this say about Sin-yee as a potentially 
rational inferrer?14
On a model-based account, Sin-yee leaves school heading in a particular direction because she has 
the goal of being home and mentally maps the available pathways connecting school and home and 
their relative advantages or disadvantages. While she might take pretty much the same route every 
afternoon, so that the matter seldom receives much thought, she is quite capable of taking alternate 
routes if her goal changes to include stopping by a friend’s or a store on the way or staying out of the 
hot sun, which could require mentally piecing together paths she’s taken for different purposes in the 
past to synthesize an overall route she has never traveled. She can mentally simulate possible com-
bined pathways before she has physically taken them, enabling her to notice possible advantages or 
disadvantages, or to compare her confidence that one or the other might work.
Let’s suppose that Sin-yee inhabits a fairly arid part of the world, and so she has encountered only 
small, shallow puddles in the past, easily stepped over or tip-toed across. This morning, however, there 
was an unusually heavy rain and, as she heads home, Sin-yee encounters her first really large, deep 
puddle. Sin-yee has never had the problem of wet shoes and feet owing to failed puddle-hopping, but 
she once got her shoes and feet soaked on a visit to the shore, and did not at all like walking back to 
where her family was staying, squishing in her shoes, or being scolded by her parents for the damage 
caused to her shoes. So her capacity to model situations causally includes such possibilities. Playing 
hop-scotch has given Sin-yee an idea of how far she can jump, and walking around obstacles has given 
her an idea of what that involves. Though she need not explicitly make any calculation, as she stares 
at the puddle her proto-inferential capacities quickly simulate and evaluate the possibilities of hopping 
vs. walking around, and she opts to walk around. Should we call this an inference on her part, given 
that she does not “think to herself that she has to walk around the puddle if she wants to keep her feet 
dry”, as Siegel puts it?
So far, one might say, Sin-yee’s mental activity would seem to just what one would observe in her 
furry proto-inferential animal relatives in like circumstances—leveraging previous learning to simu-
late, evaluate, and compare options at a choice point, such that motivation to act shifts accordingly. We 
don’t want to be speciesist—is there a principled difference between the two cases that would warrant 
our saying that Sin-yee infers, or manifests rationality, while the rat does not? There is, I believe, and 
it has nothing to do with Sin-yee being human in particular, and nothing to do with forming a reckon-
ing-state. It has to do with her overall standing as an agent, her capacity for acting intentionally.15
Suppose we come across Sin-yee, stopped staring at the edge of the puddle, and ask her the 
Anscombean question, “What are you doing, stopping there like that?” She might reply, “I don’t know, 
I’m just standing here” or “Have I stopped? I hadn’t noticed.” But that is very unlikely. More likely 
she’ll say, “I’m thinking.” Sin-yee, in other words, is not just host to a bout of proto-inference—she 
is thinking intentionally, under an idea of what she’s doing, not fully articulated but still there, as the 
Anscombean question is thought to reveal. The guiding idea is something like figuring out what to do 
 14Debate continues over the relative proportion and importance of model-free vs. model-based mental processes in intelligent 
animals and humans (Dayan & Berridge 2014). So our contrast is more precisely put as between an agent capable of both 
model-based and model-free thought, vs. one capable only of model-free thought, like the Behaviorist’s Sin-yee.
 15I am assuming for the sake of argument that rats, even though their behavior is guided by expected-value assessments, are 
not “acting under an idea” in the manner of intentional action in humans. This could be unduly uncharitable—rats keep 
surprising us.
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about the puddle given that she wants to get home with dry feet. This idea gives structure and a suc-
cess condition to what she is doing, and converts her thinking from unself-conscious proto-inferential 
activity into potentially self-conscious inferential action in which she is trying to utilize the informa-
tion she has to solve a problem posed by the situation, and how well she does this will “redound” to 
whether she can do this better or worse. For contrast: Imagine that Sin-yee has been told by her parents 
and teachers not to stoop so much when she walks and stands. If we were instead to have asked Sin-
yee, standing staring at the puddle, “What are you doing there, stooping like that?”, she’d very likely 
reply, “Am I stooping? I hadn’t noticed.”
We can further ask Sin-yee, “Thinking about what?”, and she’ll likely have a ready reply, “The 
puddle.” “And what are you thinking about it?” “It looks too big.” “Too big for what?” “Too big to 
jump over, of course.” “So what will you do about that?” “Well that’s what I’m thinking about, silly.” 
Sin-yee has learned how to focus her attention to a situation in a way that engages her proto-inferential 
capacities, and how to sense when they’ve been exercised enough, or how confident she should be of 
their working. In this way her inferential capacities are like other skills she’s acquired. She is able to 
deploy her acquired competence in “figuring out” in much the same way as she is able to deploy her 
acquired competence in language. When she speaks, she speaks intentionally and grammatically, a 
form of person-level action even though she would be at a loss to say how she uses her implicit model 
of the grammar of the language so effectively, or what it consists in. Still, the relations in that model 
can suitably guide her speech, and she can be aware of whether a given sentence “sounds right” or 
“sounds wrong”, even as she is saying it. Let’s say that she speaks a different language at home from 
the language she speaks at school. Sin-yee then can intentionally employ one language competence 
rather than another, not simply by responding to the immediate context—she can enjoy using her 
school language at home to share secrets with her siblings that her parents can’t understand—but by 
adapting choice of language, language register, etc., to her goals. Sin-yee’s intentional control of her 
speech, and the credit she deserves for speaking well, or slyly, or aptly, does not require that she be 
able to say why one vocabulary or sentence-form was chosen rather than another. None of these pro-
cesses are purely sub-personal or opaque—we can, by asking the right questions, unearth a number of 
important elements of her thinking and linguistic and social competence. Her thinking skill likewise. 
She often will be able to supply appropriate answers in the form of considerations that did play a role 
in her thinking, because her thinking was model-based, and these considerations were integral parts of 
those models. “Why do you care whether the puddle is too big to jump?”—“Because I don’t want to 
get my shoes wet.” “Why care about whether you get your shoes wet?”—“Because it’s yucky walking 
with wet shoes.” “I thought you liked hopping”—“I do, but it’s worse to have wet shoes.” Moreover 
if Sin-yee were halfway around the puddle, only to discover that the ground there is very muddy and 
the puddle past that point much shallower than she thought, this discrepancy will catch her attention, 
and she will be able to focus on her new situation in a way that mobilizes other relevant experiences 
and abilities, and delicately tiptoe across. And if we were to ask, “Why are you tip-toeing like that?”, 
she’d have an answer.
Sin-yee is able to see what is being demanded by our questions because of her capacity to model 
herself as well as the world around her, allowing her to enter into critical dialogue on questions of 
about why she is doing what she’s doing, and join the realm of self-reflective and potentially ratio-
nal agents, much to the delight of those around her. But, as before, her apt responsiveness has to do 
with her ability to supply conscious direction to her model-based figuring out capacities, and their 
ability to deliver intelligent, reliable, evidence-sensitive responses owing to her proto-inferential ca-
pacities. What she needs if she is to be skilled in figuring out is that her information-state itself have 
enough structure and content to encode the spatial, causal, probabilistic, means-ends, etc. relations 
upon which the support for, and guidance of, her figuring out depends. And that is what a model-based 
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infrastructure provides, in which she can use her higher-order representational capacities to ask herself 
the questions we are asking her.
Sin-yee’s capacity for inferring that bears features (i)-(iv), I’ve been arguing, depends upon her 
capacity to impart intentional direction to her proto-inferential capacities—like Feynman, she can act 
under the idea of figuring something out, and do this with increasing skill as she matures. This inten-
tion, like any intention, binds together the various elements of her figuring out behavior, and explains 
why figuring out what to do about the puddle is her response to the situation before her, rather than 
something that simply happens to her.
Recently, however, Paul Boghossian has argued that we cannot invoke intention to explain what 
makes a mental transition an inference. After all, doesn’t acting on an intention already involve infer-
ring? Boghossian makes this point forcefully against an intentional reading of following a rule:
Intentional Construal (IC): On this Intentional construal of rule-following, … my ac-
tively applying a rule can only be understood as a matter of my grasping what the rule 
requires, forming a view to the effect that its trigger conditions are satisfied, and drawing 
the conclusion that I must now perform the act required by its consequent. … [Thus] on 
the Intentional view of rule-following, rule-following requires inference. [Boghossian 
(2014, p. 13]
Translating to the case at hand, an (IC) account of what it would take for Sin-yee to be figuring out 
what to do about the puddle would have to be understood in terms of her grasping what is to be figured 
out, reaching a view to the effect that a given course of thought would be instrumental to carrying out that 
task, forming the intention to do this, and applying that intention in action. Plainly, we have just inserted 
further inferential processes into the purported explanation of inferential processes. This is worse than no 
headway—we are regressing. Boghossian writes, “I am now inclined to think [that this difficulty] is at 
the heart of Wittgenstein’s discussion of following a rule” (2014, p. 12). Rather than give up altogether 
on the idea that we are rational animals capable of genuine inference, Boghossian suggests that we take 
rule-following to be an unanalyzable primitive (2014, p. 17).
However, the picture of acting intentionally offered by (IC) cannot constitute the basic under-
standing of what it is to act intentionally. To be sure, sometimes we form express intentions, or ask 
and determine what they require, or decide to set them in motion, etc. But all of these are themselves 
intentional actions, so we clearly haven’t gotten to the bottom of things. If acting intentionally is ever 
to be possible, then it must be possible to act intentionally without having to form and execute an 
intention to do so. And Sin-yee can intentionally think about what to do about the puddle without 
forming an intention to do so—she stopped to think abruptly, but not accidentally or unwittingly or 
against her will. As her answers to our questions reveal, her thinking was guided by the idea of getting 
home and her preference for dry shoes and feet. No formation of an intention to stop, or to deliberate, 
or to conclude her deliberating, need occur.
The moral of the model-based approach to cognition and control is that one can be intelligently 
guided by one’s “take” on a situation—one’s spatial and causal modeling, one’s preferences or aims, 
the feedback one receives in the course of acting, etc.—in a continuous process, without engaging in 
distinguished component actions like “forming an intention”, “applying an intention”, etc. An idea of 
what one is seeking and why can guide one’s mental and physical activity through control and feed-
back in such a way as to constitute purposive, intentional action, without positing a string of internal 
actions to carry this out. And that had better be the case, if acting intentionally is to be possible at all.
Reviewing: Sin-yee’s figuring out what to do about the puddle bears the relevant marks, (i)-(iv). 
It is person-level mental action that results in reaching a conclusion in response to the individual’s 
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information state, and that redounds well or badly on the individual in part according to whether the 
contents of the antecedent states epistemically support the contents of the conclusion. The “right sort” 
of becausal relation for inferring, if her case is typical, involves intentional and not merely mechanical 
causality—it exists when the movements of the mind are organized under and guided by the individu-
al’s implicit or explicit aim of trying to figure something out, even if her knowledge of the antecedent 
information that will be brought to bear or the support relations linking this information to her con-
clusion is limited. We might not be good at introspecting the inner workings of most of our figurings 
out—ordinary causal inference, for example, draws upon a vast amount of acquired information and 
multiple simulations. But, at least by Sin-yee’s age, we are pretty good at directing our minds to a 
particular task of figuring something out. Just as we can mobilize the rich resources of our perceptual 
system for interpreting something in our visual field by directing our attention to it and focusing in on 
it, we can mobilize the rich resources of our inferential infrastructure and current information-state 
for figuring something out by directing our mental attention to it and focusing in on it. In neither case 
do we need to know—nor could we know, in general—just why we reach the conclusion we do, so the 
Self-Awareness condition is not fully met. But the intentional character of the figuring out gives it an 
epistemic success condition, with the result that it becomes liable to epistemic assessment and makes 
us liable to assessment for rationality.
9 |  BEYOND THE PUDDLE
We have spent this long on Puddle, since Siegel needs only to show that there are some examples 
of “inference without reckoning” that count as inferrings. The other examples she offers (both in 
Siegel 2019 and in chapter 5 of The Rationality of Perception, Siegel 2017) raise other, interest-
ing issues. Hide-and-Seek finds the searcher intentionally trying to figure out where the hider is 
hiding by bringing to bear her proto-inferential capacities to model not only the situation and its 
possibilities, but the hider’s mind as well. Kindness finds the person waiting in line forming im-
plicit conclusions about the character of the clerk simply by focusing her eyes and attention upon 
the clerk—and smooth eye-movement and attention are, the vision scientists tell us, person-level 
voluntary actions (Lisberger 2010). And Pepperoni finds the pizza-eater in a quandary because her 
expectations, based upon her self-model of her taste, appetite, etc., have been violated, bringing 
her to focus her mind upon the problem of figuring out what’s wrong with this pizza, which then 
intentionally deploys her multi-dimensional proto-inferential causal modeling capacities inversely, 
to find possible causes for an observed effect, of which the “yuckiness” of the pepperoni seems 
initially most plausible.
In these examples, we see epistemic agents acting epistemically, though not under that description 
and not through reckoning-states. Instead, they are deploying their proto-inferential competencies to 
leverage the information they have, forward or inversely, under the idea of figuring something out. 
Figuring out, like any intentional action, can be done implicitly or explicitly, well or badly, and ratio-
nally or irrationally. Without the underlying proto-inferential architecture of the mind we inherit (and 
which is itself explained by very general facts about successful learning and control), there would be 
no competence to answer to these intentions to figure out. Perhaps an underlying model-free or asso-
ciationist architecture could yield the appearance to ourselves or others of figuring out by inferring, 
but it would be an appearance only. And without the competence in intentional action—including such 
mental actions as inferring—that characterizes the mind of potentially-rational agents (and which is 
itself explained by very general facts about the nature of rational choice and action), we would be lim-
ited in our deployment of our model-based architecture to the kinds of proto-inferences made by our 
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furry relatives. Either way, we’d be intelligent animals. But only with the two factors combined do we 
have a chance of being rational animals. Like Sin-yee.
10 |  CONCLUSION
We have been trying to make a case that “inference without reckoning” can be genuine inference. 
Whether Siegel will welcome this defense is another matter. It saves “inference without reckoning”—
indeed, it shows how “inference with reckoning” might be possible without regress—but at the cost 
of saying more about underlying mechanisms that Siegel would appear to want to say. At the same 
time, the possibility of alternative, e.g., associative, explanations of how examples like Puddle, Hide-
and-Seek, Kindness, and Pepperoni work leaves the defender of “inference without reckoning” little 
choice but to wade into questions about process. Not ad hoc, but on the basis of highly general con-
siderations about the possibility and nature of cognition, choice, control, and action.
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